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Abstract
Symmetric telecoms regulation, where it is not only the operators with signif-
icant market power (SMP) at national or large geographical scales which are
subject to special access obligations, has been on the agenda for long. How-
ever, emphasis has hitherto been on asymmetric regulation, but during the
past few years, symmetric regulation has gradually gained weight in different
EU countries, and the new European Electronic Communications Code also
aims at putting more emphasis on symmetric regulation. The paper identifies
the reasons behind symmetric access regulation possibly coming to play a
more prominent role in EU telecoms regulation, the scope of symmetric
regulation and how it is being articulated, and what the possible implications
of symmetric regulation could be on the level of investment. The contribution
of the paper is to discuss these different elements of understanding the
potential role of symmetric regulation.
Keywords: Symmetric regulation, competition, investment, European
Electronic Communications Code.
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1 Introduction
The paper aims at analyzing the implications of symmetric telecom regulation
on competition and investment in the telecom area. Symmetric regulation,
where it is not only the operators with significant market power (SMP) at
national or large geographical scales which are subject to special access
obligations, has been on the agenda for long. However, emphasis has hitherto
been on asymmetric regulation, but during the past few years, symmetric
regulation has gradually gained weight in different EU countries, and the new
European Electronic Communications Code (Directive 2018/1972) also aims
at putting more emphasis on symmetric regulation (de Streel and Larouche,
2016; Briglauer et al., 2017).
The paper elaborates on the rules for the implementation of symmetric
regulation in the Communications Code and discusses how symmetric reg-
ulation can potentially effect competition and investment. The assessment
will look at the potential impacts of symmetric regulation on competition and
discuss how competition can affect investment. The reason for this sequence
of analysis is that it is assumed that the implications of symmetric regulation
on investment, to a large extent, will be mediated by the implications of sym-
metric regulation on competition. However, symmetric regulation will also
directly impact investment in the sense that the implementation of symmetric
regulation may lower the incentives for physical infrastructure investment
by new-coming network operators to a geographical area. It could also
limit incentives for additional investment by operators that are already there
with physical networks, as they may have to open their networks for other
competing operators. But it could also lead to increased investments, which
is the hope enshrined in the new European Communications Code of 2018.
In addition to symmetric regulation, another important element in the
new European Electronic Communications Code is regulation aiming at
promoting co-investment in telecom infrastructures. This will lead to lower
investment costs for the individual operators and may increase the incentives
for operators to invest in areas they would otherwise have been hesitant to
enter. It will, furthermore, for certain, lead to a greater emphasis on service
competition as opposed to infrastructure competition. The overall purpose
of the Communications Code can be seen in light of the aim of extending
very high-capacity networks to all areas, businesses and citizens in Europe
by changing the regulatory set-up and thus the dynamics and actions of
network operators. An increased emphasis on symmetric regulation and an
enhanced promotion of co-investment is meant to invigorate competition and
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the deployment of very high-capacity networks and access of citizens in all
areas to very high-capacity connectivity by avoiding unnecessary duplication
of physical network infrastructures.
The present paper is only concerned with part of this overall purpose.
The paper contributes with elements to understanding the implications of
symmetric regulation on competition and investment. In the following sec-
tion, the provisions in the Communications Code relating to symmetric
regulation will be examined in addition to the most important regulatory inno-
vations in the Directive. Thereafter, theory contributions to understanding
the relationships between competition and investment are discussed. In the
subsequent section, statistical correlations between the level of competition
and investment are examined, and this followed by a discussion section and
a conclusion.
2 The Communications Code
The issue of symmetric and asymmetric regulation actually does not figure
prominently in the Communications Code. The word ‘symmetric’ is only
mentioned twice in the whole Directive – and one of the two times in a context
which is not relevant for the discussion here – and the word ‘asymmetric’
is only mentioned once. This does not mean that the issue of symmetric
and asymmetric regulation is not an important topic in the Communications
Code. But other concepts and ways of articulating the issue are used. In
the Directive, the issue is dealt with in terms of the more exact legal and
economic terms of Significant Market Power (SMP) and the situations in
which ex ante regulation is to be imposed.
The concepts of symmetric and asymmetric regulation are more general
concepts that can be superimposed on discussions on the balance of regu-
latory intervention in order to describe the overall structure and direction
of regulatory provisions. This is the only manner in which the concept of
symmetric regulation is used in the Directive. In one of the very last recitals of
the Directive (number 319), it is stated that ‘. . .this Directive introduces novel
approaches to the regulation of electronic communications sectors, such as
the possibility to extend the application of symmetric obligations. . . ’. These
novel approaches should be given particular attention in coming reviews of
the Directive, it is furthermore said.
Also, the issues relating to symmetric and asymmetric regulation are
only a small part of the Directive as such. The Directive 2018/1972, which
came into force in December 2018 with a deadline for national transposition
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in December 2020, replaces the four previous Directives that constituted
the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications, namely the
Framework Directive, the Access Directive, the Authorization Directive, and
the Universal Service Directive. The new Directive includes the topics of the
former Directives and amends the provisions in them. This means that the
Directive is concerned with the general aims of telecom regulation, access
and interconnection, regulatory institutions, universal service, etc. It is thus
a large and very complex directive with 326 recitals and with 127 articles
with numerous sub-articles, and the issue of symmetry and asymmetry only
plays a small and partial role in this overall piece of legislation. Nevertheless,
in overviews of the new Directive provided by, for instance, consultancy
companies and other observers (e.g. Bird and Bird, 2018 and Crowell and
Moring LLP, 2018), the question of symmetric regulation plays a central role.
The reason is obviously that this is one of the areas, where the intensions of
the new Directive differ from the previous Directives.
The explicit overall new direction of the Directive is to give greater
emphasis to provisions that will incentivize investments in high-speed broad-
band networks. In recital 23 of the Directive, it is stated that ‘. . .in addition
to the exiting three primary objectives of promoting competition, the internal
market and end user interests. . . ’, the Directive should ‘. . .pursue an addi-
tional connectivity objective, articulated in terms of outcomes: widespread
access to and take up of very high capacity networks for all citizens of
the Union and Union businesses. . . ’. It is also said in recital 26 that ‘both
efficient investment and competition should be encouraged in tandem, in
order to increase economic growth, innovation and consumer choice’. From
the previous relatively one-sided focus on the promotion of competition, more
emphasis should be on advancing investments. This is a position that has been
increasingly prominent on the political agenda in the last decade, and it has
now become a central cornerstone in the legal communications network and
service legislation. The reason is that it has, to a growing extent, been realized
that competition in itself does not necessarily lead to investments at the pace
and amounts considered necessary and that special attention in policies and
regulation has to be on increasing investments.
Another major new development of the Directive is the increased scope
in terms of including OTT-services. The term OTT-services itself is not
mentioned in the Directive, but the Directive seeks to deal with the issue of
OTT by means of the concept of number-independent interpersonal commu-
nications services (ICS). In the Directive, the concept of ICS is introduced,
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and the Directive differentiates between number-dependent and number-
independent services. On the basis of the previous Directives in the field,
it has been unclear whether different OTT-services should be subject to
regulation like other interpersonal communications services. Court cases have
been raised, and the new Directive seeks to deal with this matter by including
number-independent ICS.
But there will still be uncertainties, as number-dependent and number-
independent ICS will not be subject to the same degree of regulation.
It is stated in recital 18 of the Directive: ‘Number-independent interpersonal
communications services should be subject to obligations only where public
interests require that specific regulatory obligations apply to all types of inter-
personal communications services, regardless of whether they use numbers
for the provision of their service. It is justified to treat number-based interper-
sonal communications services differently, as they participate in, and hence
also benefit from, a publicly assured interoperable ecosystem’. However, the
new direction in the Directive is summarized in recital 151, where it is stated
that national regulatory authorities can ‘impose proportionate obligations
. . . on those providers of number-independent interpersonal communications
services with significant level of coverage and user-uptake’.
In the EU legislative system, there are three kinds of directives dealing
with communication services. One kind of Directives (now one Directive)
is concerned with ‘telecom-like’ services; another Directive is the Audio
Visual Media Service Directive (AVMS) dealing with ‘broadcast-like’ ser-
vices; and the last one is the Information Society Service Directive – also
called the e-commerce directive – which deals with, in reality, the residual
group of communications services. When this latter Directive was created,
Internet-based services were a new category of services that were difficult to
categorize as either ‘telecom-like’ or ‘broadcast-like’. Also, legislators stood
back from imposing known regulatory provisions on these new services,
as this might constrain the development of Internet services. However, as
time has passed and Internet has become the dominant infrastructure for
communications, the scope of AVMS has been expanded to include first on-
demand ‘broadcast-like’ services, for instance Netflix, and lately in 2018 also
audio-visual services on YouTube and Facebook. Similarly, the Directive for
‘telecom-like’ services has now come to include number-independent ICS.
The Information Society Directive in the middle gets increasingly squeezed,
but as it is said in the new telecom Directive in recital 7: ‘It is necessary to
separate the regulation of electronic communications networks and services
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from the regulation of content’. These two areas of regulation are not to be
mixed.
With respect to symmetric and asymmetric regulation, this question is
primarily dealt with in recitals 144 to 158. In recital 145, it is stated: ‘In light
of the principle on non-discrimination, national regulatory authorities should
ensure that all undertakings irrespective of their size and business model,
whether vertically integrated or separated, can interconnect on reasonable
terms and conditions, with a view to providing end-to-end connectivity and
access to the internet’. Even though this applies to ‘all undertakings irre-
spective of their size and business model’, there are significant differences
between small and large operators. The situations where symmetric regu-
lation will primarily apply is focused on ‘. . .situations where undertakings
are deprived of access to viable alternatives to non-replicable wiring, cables
and associated facilities inside buildings or up to the first concentration
or distribution point. . . ’ (recital 152); . . .in order to promote competitive
outcomes in the interest of end-users, national regulatory authorities should
be empowered to impose access obligations on all undertakings, irrespective
of a designation as having significant market power’ (recital 152). This means
that the focus is on facilities inside building or up to the first concentration
or distribution point. However, in recital 154, it is also stated that ‘it could
be justified to extend access obligations to wiring and cables beyond the first
concentration or distribution point while confining such obligations to points
as close as possible to end-users. . . ’. However, this should only be ‘. . .where
it is demonstrated that replication faces high and non-transitory physical
or economic barriers, leading to important competition problems or market
failures at the retail level to the detriment of end-users’ (recital 154). In such
a situation, ‘. . .the national regulatory authority does not need to establish
significant market power in order to impose these obligations’ (recital 154).
The scope of symmetric regulation is thus limited in terms of where in
the network access obligations can be imposed on market players without
significant market power. Furthermore, it is also said in recital 152 that ‘. . .as
such obligations can in certain cases be intrusive, can undermine incentives
for investments, and can have the effect of strengthening the position of dom-
inant players, they should be imposed only where justified and proportionate
to achieving sustainable competition in the relevant markets’.
Nevertheless, the Directive does introduce some degree of symmetric reg-
ulation – or, in other words, the imposition of access obligations on operators
that do not hold significant market power. At the same time, the intension is
to lower asymmetric regulation. It is stated in recital 29: ‘This Directive aims
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to progressively reduce ex ante sector-specific rules as competition in the
markets develops and, ultimately, to ensure that electronic communications
are governed only by competition law’. This has certainly been the aim since
the start of the telecom reform process starting in the 1980s, but it seems that
the EU legislators believe that we are getting closer to this situation and that it
is time to seek to implement additional rules to lower asymmetric regulation.
This applies in the Directive, for instance, to provisions regarding obligations
on SMP operators that offer commitments in connection with co-investment
arrangement (recital 205).
With the overall goal of promoting ‘. . .incentives for investment in high-
speed broadband networks’ (recital 3) and of increasing ‘. . .widespread
access to and take-up of very high capacity networks. . . ’ (recital 23), there is
an increased focus on investments, on sharing of facilities – not only passive
but also active – and on symmetric regulation. This seems to be a clear
direction of the new Directive, while the actual ‘road’ to get there is more
unclear and subject to many upcoming disputes and regulatory decisions –
which is why we have cited the recitals extensively.
3 Theory Contributions
The focus of this section is on theory approaches as to how symmetric
regulation will affect investment. It should, however, be noted that the role
of symmetric regulation – also with the new Directive – is rather limited,
as it has been shown in the previous section. It is thus, to a larger extent, a
discussion on general theoretical relationships and not so much a discussion
on the actual implications of the provisions in the Directive.
As it was explained in the introduction, the primary relationships that
will be discussed are those between symmetric regulation, competition and
investment – where competition mediates between symmetric regulation and
investment. However, as it was also explained, there are also direct relation-
ships between symmetric regulation and investment, as symmetric regulation
may lead to less investment by operators that already have physical networks
in the geographical areas concerned as well as operators seeking to offer
network services in these areas. It may also lead to increased investments
if the incentives for investing are increased by lower investment costs for the
individual operators.
Furthermore, it has to be taken into consideration that the overall goal
of the Directive concerning very high-capacity networks is to extend con-
nectivity, which does not necessarily require larger investments in total. This
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is where co-investment comes in, as this may lead to increased connectivity
even though total investments by all operators do not increase. The ‘elements’
that will be discussed in this section thus comprise symmetric regulation,
competition, investment, and connectivity.
The discussions on the implications of ex ante access regulation go
back to the liberalization of the telecoms area. In the 1990s when the area
was liberalized and sector-specific regulation was implemented, the issue of
symmetric and asymmetric regulation was also discussed, and there were
spokesmen for giving symmetric regulation more emphasis (Schankerman,
1996; Knieps, 1997) – a position that was supported by incumbent operators.
However, sector-specific access regulation came to focus on asymmetric
regulation, because of the dominance of the former monopolies and the aim
of establishing competition in the markets. The fastest way to establish some
kind of competition was to open the networks of the incumbent operators
to new service providers, and the expectation was that this, on a longer
run, would lead to infrastructure competition. This was the approach of
the theory on the ladder-of-investment (LoI), explaining that, at first, new-
coming operators would take the opportunity of using the networks of the
incumbents and compete on a service-base; later on, they would invest in
their own infrastructure in order to get a firmer grip on the market (Cave,
2006). The experiences with operators climbing up a LoI have generally not
lived up to expectations, and the theory has been subject to much criticism
(e.g. Bourreau et al., 2010). It has been pointed out that it may be that service
competition leads to a faster take-up (penetration) of services, at least in
the beginning, but infrastructure competition will in the end lead to better
coverage and, therefore, more solid competition (Yoo, 2014). This is part
of the background for the relaxations of asymmetric regulation. There has
thus been a long discussion on these issues, and the learnings from these
discussions are important for the new discussion on symmetric regulation.
The question regarding the relationships between competition and invest-
ment is one of the major issues in the history of economics. Mathis and
Sand-Zantman (2014) have made a short and concise summary of how this
question has been dealt with in economics. They take the history overview
back to Adam Smith and much later Joseph Schumpeter, where the economic
tradition building on Smith has seen competition as promoting investment
and where the tradition building on Schumpeter (at least in the Mark II
version) has argued that too much competition can hurt investment, as there
will not be sufficient profit to invest. Mathis and Sand-Zantman (2014) write
that, in the manner in which the issue has been dealt with in economics, the
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implications of competition on investment depend on where in the process of
competition an industry is positioned. In the early stages, competition may
promote incentives to invest, while incentives will be lower at later stages.
In this context Mathis and Sand-Zantman refer to the well-known idea of
the inverted-U shaped curve developed by Aghion et al. (2005). In the paper
on ‘Competition and innovation: An inverted-U relationship’ from 2005,
Aghion et al. developed a model where ‘competition discourages laggard
firms from innovating but encourages neck-to-neck firms to innovate’. The
issue in the paper by Aghion et al. (2005) is thus on the relationships
between competition and innovation, and the major contribution of the paper
by Mathis and Sand-Zantman is to discuss the issue of competition and
investment in light of investment being in innovations as well as in what they
call ‘infrastructure investment’ – meaning investment that do not represent
an innovation but an investment in building up physical infrastructure. This
is a helpful differentiation, as it provides a basis for caution when trying
to implement the idea of an inverted-U shaped curve on the relationships
between competition and investment. In practice, however, it can be diffi-
cult to differentiate between innovations and infrastructure investments, as
infrastructure investments may be in technology solutions, which represent
some degree of improvement, and as it may be investments in areas, where
infrastructure technologies indeed are new. Thus referring to the discussions
of, e.g., Schumpeter on what innovations are, there is an overlap between
innovations and infrastructure investments – or to put it otherwise, there are
different kinds of investments: some in innovations and some in extending
existing infrastructure.
In a paper from 2015, Houngbonon and Jeanjean discuss the level of
competition intensity and investment in the wireless industry. They apply
the concept of an inverted-U shaped relationship and find that ‘the non-
parametric methods suggest an inverted-U shaped relationship between
competition and investment in the wireless industry’. The paper is primarily
an empirical investigation of the issue, but it also refers to theory discussions
on the relationships between competition and investment with reference to
Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962). While Arrow emphasizes an ‘escape-
competition effect’, where companies will invest in order to win the market by
investing and out-competing (escaping) other companies, those who follow
Schumpeter put focus of the ‘efficiency effect’ of a monopolist. In the first
phases of an upcoming market, some companies will attempt to escape
competition by investing, and later on when the market has matured, the
companies who dominate the market will have efficiency advantages.
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In a paper also from 2015, Lesca refers to the findings of Houngbonon and
Jeanjean (2015) regarding the inverted-U shaped curve of the relationships
between competition and investment in the wireless industry. The aim of the
paper by Lesca (2015) is to promote the idea of finding an ‘optimal level of
competition intensity that allows dynamic competition through investment’.
The paper by Lesca (2015) is more normative than the abovementioned
papers and argues that ‘the level of competition and the continuous need for
investments call for a move from the current asymmetric regulation, based
on the SMP concept, to a symmetric one’. The argument is that a sufficient
level of competition has been reached in the ‘very high broadband’ market
and that it is time to lift or, at least, reduce the level of asymmetric regulation
and rely on symmetric regulation to a greater extent. In this text, the issue of
symmetric regulation is thus related to investment.
The relationships between the implementation of symmetric regulation
and investment are also investigated in a paper by Briglauer et al. from 2017.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the then upcoming proposal for the
European Electronic Communications Code, and one of the issues taken up
in the paper is how symmetric regulation should be implemented if it is to
lead to increased investments. Another question that they also discuss is co-
investment, and they see both issues, symmetric regulation and regulation
for promoting co-investment, in light of how such regulations can increase
investments. Symmetric regulation does, according to the authors, not nec-
essarily lead to increased investments. This depends on how symmetric
regulation is interpreted and implemented.
In the paper, they write: ‘Insofar as symmetrical obligations are suitable
for delivering synergy potentials and lowering total investment costs . . . the
will increase the profitability of NGA projects and, ceteris paribus, overall
investment activity’. They also write: ‘It is important to note . . . that in order
to increase investment, symmetric regulations must not ultimately result in
extending asymmetric access regulation to a variety of infrastructure elements
and all infrastructure operators regardless of actual market power (SMP)’.
And, when assessing the then upcoming Communications Code, they believe
that ‘the proposed symmetric access regulations actually entail the potential
to significantly expand the current regulation’. The point of view is that if
one wants to increase investment by implementing symmetric regulation, this
must be part of an overall ‘softer’ regulation and not as implementing the
rules applying to SMP-operators to non-SMP-operators.
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In order to systematize and potentially operationalize the theoretical
propositions, different relationships (not all of them mentioned in the ref-
erenced texts) are listed in the following overview:
• Co-investment will lead to lower investment costs for the individ-
ual operators participating in the joint investment operation and will
increase incentives for investing.
• Co-investment may or may not lead to increased overall investment by
all participating operators, but will lead to extended connectivity.
• Co-investment will lead to more emphasis on service-based competition.
• Symmetric regulation will lead to more emphasis on service-based
competition.
• Symmetric regulation may lead to increased investment investments if
the incentives for investing are increased by lower investment costs for
the individual operators.
• Symmetric regulation may, on the other hand, also lead to lower invest-
ments by the non-SMP operator present in the market as well as new
incoming operators.
• Initial competition may lead to more innovative investments in first
stages of market developments.
• Too much competition may lead to lower overall investments in later
stages of market developments.
As can be seen from this list of relationships, there are no certain cor-
relations. It very much depends on how the rules for symmetric regulation
and co-investment are implemented and the existing market circumstances.
In the following figure, a model of the elements that have to be taken into
consideration is depicted.
Symmetric
Co-invest.
Compeon
Investments –
innovave and
non-innovave
Connecvity
Figure 1 Analytical model.
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4 Correlation Analysis
Studying the relationships between competition and investment in a sector
like telecom is not a straightforward thing. The level of competition may
be very different in different parts of the country, and a mere counting of
suppliers within a country may overstate the level of competition, as not all
suppliers have a national coverage. Especially in rural areas, there may be
only 1–2 possible providers (if any) even though a large number of national
operators exist.
In addition to geographical variations, the telecom sector includes a
number of different markets with very different levels of competition. Within
the EU, a number of submarkets have been defined and market studies for
each of these markets are performed in order to assess whether regulatory
invention is needed and to be preferred compared to a ‘free’ market. These
submarkets are often highly interdependent, as they may offer either sub-
stitutes or complementary services. Examples of this could be substitution
between wireless and fixed broadband services and services complementing
network facilities. Even if these markets could be assumed to be independent,
it is difficult to determine the levels of investments on each market, as they
may be sharing the same facilities.
Another distinction to be made is between facility based and service based
competition. With regard to broadband, facility based competition can either
be among identical or different technology platforms. Early studies focused
on service based competition in existing telecom networks. These studies
indicated that the liberalization of the telecom sector made in the 1990s
was accommodated by a growth in investments and some competition. A
study from 2004 (Henten et al., 2004) shows a positive relationship between
competition and investments. The study creates a composite competition
index and compares the incumbent markets shares in the provision of major
telecom services with investment levels in selected EU countries.
With regard to competition in broadband markets, it is especially impor-
tant to distinguish between services based and facility based competition.
For service based competition, the general conclusion seems to be that
service based competition promotes immediate competition, leading to lower
prices and higher subscription rates, but that it may limit investments in
new infrastructures and coverage by high-speed technologies. When it comes
to facility based competition, several studies conclude that competition
promotes investments.
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A large number of studies are concerned with the policy impact on the
level of investments. Especially the role of policy promoting investments
in broadband has been widely studied. These studies are not addressing
the competition issue directly. However, many of the regulatory measures
studies are implemented in order to facilitate competition. It would, there-
fore, be reasonable to assume that a positive impact of such policies
on investments also indicates a positive relation between competition and
investments.
Within this field, the impact of access regulation has been widely studied
in particular in the US. According to (Friederiszick, 2008) there is some
empirical support for the hypothesis that low access prices have promoted
investments. Among others, Sidak has disputed this conclusion both theoret-
ically and empirically (e.g. Jorde, Sidak and Teece, 2000). The argument is
that with low access charges, new entrants will be less inclined to invest in
their own facilities, and investments made by the the incumbent will be less
profitable. Not all of these studies use investments the dependent variable, but
analyses the impact on coverage or penetration instead. Such data are more
accessible and might be more relevant success parameters in the expansion
phase for broadband networks. In addition, they can be expected to be highly
correlated with the level of investments.
The relationship between competition and investments in mobile net-
works has been analyzed in a recent study by WIK (Elixmann et al., 2015).
This study looks at a number of different factors driving investments. These
include costs and demand factors as well as competition. Investments are
measured as CAPEX/revenue and CAPEX per subscriber. Three different
indicators for the level of competition are applied: The HHI index, number of
MNOs, and presence of maverick firms (companies that behave in a manner
that differs from the industry norm, e.g. by aggressive price setting). The
study is based on data from 2005 to 2014. The study concludes that there is
no indication that less competition is related to a higher level of investments.
The presence of maverick firms has a positive correlation with investments in
four out of ten years.
In this paper, we have used the Digital Agenda key indicators to per-
form an analysis of the competition-investment relation. These data include
market shares of the incumbent mobile operator for each country, but no
similar indicators are available for fixed network operators. With regard to
investments, only total telecom investments are included. Data are available
for the years 2009–2015. The table below depicts the correlation between
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Table 1 Market shares of leading mobile operators and total telecom investments for EU
countries 2009–2015
Market Share of Total Telecom Correlation
Leading Mobile Investments as % of Between the Two
Year Operator Revenue Parameters
2009 44.3% 14.3% 0.438
2010 44.6% 14.2% 0.295
2011 43.6% 14.0% 0.218
2012 42.6% 15.1% 0.322
2013 42.5% 15.4% 0.094
2014 41.0% 16.7% −0.138
2015 39.1% 17.5% −0.066
Average, all years 42.5% 15.3% 0.166
Source: https://digital-agenda-data.eu/datasets/digital_agenda_scoreboard_key_indicators/
visualizations
these two indicators. Market shares for the leading operator and total tele-
com investments as percentage of total revenue are calculated for each
year as a simple average for 23–27 national market within the EU. The
correlation shows the correlation between market share and investments for
each year.
It follows that there is a decreasing trend in the market shares for the
leading operator, while there is increasing trend in investments as % of
revenue. This could lead to the immediate conclusion that more competition
facilitates more investments. One should however be very cautious with such
a conclusion. The WIK study analyzing the mobile markets in a similar
group of countries in almost the same period of time uses the HHI index
as a parameter for the level of competition. According to this study, no
general trend in the level of competition can be observed. In five countries
competition is growing, while it is decreasing in four countries.
More important is that this conclusion cannot be supported by the cor-
relation between market shares and investments. Here we find a positive
correlation, and this leads to the opposite conclusion: Higher market shares
(and less competition) leads to more investments. This correlation is very
weak, when looking at the average for all years. However the correlation
is much higher for 2009–2012, while it is close to zero in 2013–2015.
This could be an indication of a negative relation between competition and
investments in a specific historical period.
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5 Discussion
In the Communications Code, symmetric regulation has been launched as a
new element in the regulatory tool box. It should be noted, though, that the
scope for symmetric access regulation is relatively narrow in the Directive,
and it should also be noted that the possibilities for national regulatory
agencies (NRA) to implement symmetric access regulation already were part
of the Framework Directive from 2009 in Article 12. In a report published
by WIK from 2011, Nett and Stumpf thus discuss the implications of the
provisions in Article 12 for the German access regulation. It is, therefore, not
an entirely new issue, but what is new is the emphasis that EU puts on it
and how it is being articulated. This is also reflected in the way symmetric
regulation is dealt with by national authorities. In Denmark, for instance,
the agency that regulates telecoms infrastructure, the Energy Agency, has
commissioned a study on what the implications of symmetric regulation can
be on investments in the telecom sector, and in the Netherlands, the ministry
responsible for telecoms regulation in April 2019 launched a public consul-
tation on the introduction of symmetric access obligations. Even though the
topic is not new, there is increased focus on it.
This increased focus is the result of different development trends. One of
these trends is concerned with the emphasis on increasing not only connec-
tivity to high-capacity networks but also investments in telecommunications
infrastructures. While the assumption at the beginning of access regulation
in the 1990s was that the creation of competition would not only lead to
lower prices and higher penetration but also to growing investments and
enhanced coverage, this has turned out not always to be true, and this is
the reason for wanting to implement regulations that will grow investments.
It is also the reason for public investments in infrastructure where private
operators do not seem to have sufficient incentives to invest (Falch and
Henten, 2010).
Another trend is that it has already from the start of access regulation
been the intension that sector-specific telecom regulation should eventually
be disbanded and that the asymmetric SMP regulation would be lifted in this
context. In fact, asymmetric regulation has been lifted in retail markets, while
it still exists in wholesale markets. Incumbent operators have been putting
pressure on policy directions to limit asymmetric regulation and to promote
a greater degree of symmetry in the regulatory provisions.
There are already experiences with some degree of symmetric regu-
lation in a number of EU countries. In a paper entitled ‘Is symmetric
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access regulation a policy choice? Evidence from the deployment of NGA
in Europe’, Shortall and Cave (2015) discuss the experiences with differ-
ent broadband strategies in countries in Europe. They observe a difference
between France, Spain and Portugal, on the one side, and Belgium Germany
and the UK, on the other. In the first group of countries, there has been a wider
deployment of fiber infrastructures than in the latter group, where there is a
greater reliance on legacy copper infrastructures. The explanatory framework
that Shortall and Cave (2015) present in the paper is that the countries have
implemented different policies for broadband development.
In 2008, the regulation of broadband was contemplated by the European
Commission, and focus was on fiber loops and on access to the lowest
level passive infrastructures as opposed to access to the active infrastruc-
ture elements. However, in 2010, the policies put forward by the European
Commission had changed with a greater focus on upgrading of copper
infrastructures. France, Spain and Portugal had already adopted the policies
from 2008, while Belgium, Germany and the UK adopted the policies from
2010. In the paper, Shortall and Cave (2015) examine the implications of
these different strategies, and the conclusion is that the policies followed
by Belgium, Germany and the UK has led to a maintained emphasis on
asymmetric access regulation, while the policies followed by France, Spain
and Portugal give way to a greater degree of symmetric regulation. They also
document a significant difference in fiber deployment and investments by
alternative operators with France, Spain and Portugal as the champions of
fiber and alternative operators.
As it is mentioned in the paper by Shortall and Cave (2015), one can
discuss whether it was because of these policy strategy differences or whether
the policy differences fit in well with the already existing differences in
infrastructural points of departure. But there is no question that the policy
differences have lead in different directions, and it would seem that the
Communications Code includes the intension of bringing access regulation
in direction of what was intended in 2008.
The question is whether the Communications Code will actually achieve
this. The hope is clearly that facilitating co-investment and gradually relying
more on symmetric regulation, as opposed to the existing primarily asymmet-
ric regulation regime, will lead to more investments and to better connectivity
to very high-capacity networks. In an assessment by Georg Serentschy from
May 2018 (Serentschy, 2018), half a year before the adoption of the Commu-
nications Code, a serious concern was raised as to whether the new Directive
would actually achieve what was the intension at the outset of process of
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changing the European regulatory framework. Serentschy (2018) writes that
‘the essential concern is whether the future system of regulation will ever
function at a practical level, as it will be based on a parallelogram of forces
hinging on SMP regulation, symmetric regulation, universal service and state
aid – without clear distinctions between those areas and without any clear
definition of the interdependencies amongst them’.
A similar concern is found in the abovementioned paper by Briglauer
et al. (2017), where it is formulated in a softer manner stating that the outcome
of an enhanced emphasis on co-investment and symmetric regulation is
uncertain and depends on how it will be implemented. As it is expressed
in the 8 statements in the theory section of the present paper, the correlations
are not obvious. Developments with respect to investments can go in different
and even opposing directions.
In the model presented in the theory section, enhancing competition
is still the central core of the relations between co-investment, symmetric
regulation, investments and connectivity. This is how it has been viewed since
competition was introduced in telecommunications. However, investments
are not considered to be sufficient and the role of competition has to be
combined with other measures. In the model, this is illustrated by the direct
impacts of co-investment and symmetric regulation on investments, and state
aid could be added as another measure. The concern is how these different
elements are combined and what the interdependencies are.
In the section on correlation analyses, various approaches to analyzing the
competition-investment relationships are mentioned, and a simple correlation
analysis based on figures from the Digital Agenda database is conducted. The
great difficulties in conducting such analyses and assembling relevant data are
discussed, and the results reached in the correlation analysis presented in this
paper are relatively inconclusive. If any conclusion can be made, the figures
point towards a negative relationship between competition and investment.
This could indicate that competition has moved beyond the optimum on
the inverted U shaped curve. However, this negative relationship seems to
disappear after 2012.
The paper by Houngbonon and Jeanjean (2015) includes documentation
that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between competition and
investment in the wireless industry. Such analyses and interpretation of the
relationships between competition and investment could be valid arguments
behind the policy directions of lowering asymmetric regulation and giving
more emphasis to symmetric regulation. The kind of competitive environment
that has existed with the asymmetric model could be said to have exhausted its
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potentials for increasing investment. The positive investment incentives from
neck-to-neck competition have been exhausted and the incentives of ‘lag-
gards’ are decreasing. Such could be the line of argumentation for changing
the dynamics of competition. This is surely the line of argumentation in the
paper by Lesca (2015). Symmetric regulation and policies for encouraging
co-investment could constitute elements of creating such new dynamics in
the telecommunications industry.
6 Conclusion
The paper aims at identifying reasons behind symmetric access regulation
possibly coming to play a more prominent role in EU telecoms regulation,
the scope of symmetric regulation and how it is being articulated, and what
the possible implications of symmetric regulation could be on the level
of investment. The contribution of the paper is to discuss these different
elements of understanding the potential role of symmetric regulation.
In the Communications Code from December 2018, to be transposed
nationally no later than December 2020, symmetric access regulation is
presented as a new dimension of the EU telecoms regulatory framework.
One can discuss how new it really is, as it already was part of Article 12 in
the former Framework Directive and as different EU countries already have
embarked on implementing symmetric regulation to a larger degree than other
countries. One can also discuss how wide the scope for symmetric regulation
really is in the new Communications Code. However, there is no doubt that
there is and will be increased attention to and emphasis on implementing
provisions for symmetric regulation in the national regulations. The fact that
national authorities have received these signals underline that changes are
taking place.
The aim of focusing more on symmetric regulation in companion with
promoting co-investments is to increase investments and extend coverage of
very high-capacity broadband networks to all corners of Europe. Policies
have hitherto been based on the assumption that improving conditions for
competition would be the main driver for increasing investment. But if the
policy signals around the Communications Code are to be taken for granted,
more direct focus on investments is to be given. The aim is to develop a
new set of competitive dynamics in the telecoms sector with elements of
symmetric regulation and the promotion of co-investment.
The question raised by different observers (e.g. Briglauer et al. (2017) and
Serentschy (2018)) is whether the new regulatory framework will achieve this
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in reality. With the many different interests of stakeholders that have had to be
taken into consideration, the question is whether the Communications Code
has become incoherent and points in too many different directions. It will
very much depend on how the Directive is interpreted and implemented.
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